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JURISDICTIONAL STATEl\fENT 
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Annotated Section 78A-4-
103(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
A. Questions Presented and Standard of Review 
1. The District Court erred in denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of 
Judgment because the Defendants had fully or substantially complied with all material 
terms of the Settlement Agreement, the Plaintiff received the full fruits of the Agreement 
and Plaintiff was required to release the stipulated judgment. 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court standard of review is for Correctness. 
See Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Four-Four, Inc., 2009 UT 43, ~19, 216 P.3d 352 (Utah, 
2009) (citation omitted) (stating that "[t]he interpretation of a contract is controlled by the 
intentions of the parties to the contract."); See Also Richardson v. Hart, 2009 UT App 
387, P6, 223 PJd 484 (Utah Ct. App. 2009) (stating that "[w]e review a district court's 
interpretation of a written contract for correctness, granting no deference to the court 
below.'' (citing Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, LLC, 2009 UT 27, P 21,207 
P.3d 1235 (Utah 2009); see Also Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT APP 216,239 P.3d 519, P4 
(Utah Ct. App. 2010) . 
Preservation for Appeal. [R. at 775, 3891]. 
2. The District Court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment when an evidentiary hearing was 
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scheduled, witnesses were subpoenaed and present, a pre-hearing order had been entered 
for that purpose and abundant questions of material fact remained in order to decide the 
issues presented in Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. 
Standard of Review: The Appellate Court standard of review is for Correctness. 
See Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossing, LLC, 2010 UT 40, PIO, 238 P. 3d 1035 
(Utah 2010) (stating that "'[t]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law 
that we review for correctness.") (citing State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, Pl 1, 218 P.3d 
610 (Utah 2009); see Also Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT APP 216,239 P.3d 519, P4 (Utah 
Ct. App. 2010) C'An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate 
grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and vie,,vs the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party."). 
Preservation for Appeal. [R. at 775, 3891]. 
3. The District Court erred by adjudicating the Motion for Satisfaction of 
Judgment as a Motion for Summary Judgment but then failed to make any determination 
as to material questions of fact and failed to enter any memorandum decision. 
Specifically, the District Court failed to articulate any grounds on the record or in its 
order as to why it denied Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. 
Standard of Review. The Appellate Court standard of review is for Correctness. 
See Arbogast Family Trust v. River Crossing, LLC, 2010 UT 40, PIO, 238 P. 3d 1035 
(Utah 2010) (stating that '"[t]he interpretation of a rule of procedure is a question of law 
2 
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that we review for correctness.") (citing State v. Rodrigues, 2009 UT 62, Pl 1,218 P.3d 
610 (Utah 2009)); See Also Daniels v. Ganuna FVest Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, 
P46 (Utah 2009) (stating that ''the district court's interpretation of ... statutes and the 
common law are questions oflav,1 that we review for correctness.") (citing Ellis v. Estate 
of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, P 6, 169 P.3d 441 (Utah 2007). 
Presen1ation for Appeal. [R. at 775, 3891]. 
4. The District Court erred when it incorrectly interpreted Utah law with 
respect to allowing evidence regarding the parties' mutual and/or unilateral mistake 
relating to the inclusion of an errant legal description in the Settlement Agreement. The 
District Court apparently determined that evidence of mistake cannot be introduced to 
reform or modify a contract if the contract contains an integration clause. Such a ruling 
is legal error. In doing so, the District Court incorrectly interpreted Tangren Family 
Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT~ 20. 
Standard of Review. The Appellate Court standard of review is for Correctness. 
The District Court's determination is a question of law due to its determination not to 
take evidence on mistake and the ultimate conclusion to disregard the Defendants' claim 
for mistake. See Daniels v. Ganuna West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, P46 (Utah 
. 2009) (stating th.at "the district court's interpretation of ... -statutes and the common law 
are questions of law that ,ve review for correctness.") (citing Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 
UT 77, P 6, 169 P.3d 441 (Utah 2007)); See Also Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT APP 216, 
239 P.3d 519, P4 (Utah Ct. App. 2010) ("An appellate court reviews a trial comi's legal 
3 
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conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and views 
the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party."). 
Preservation for Appeal. [R. at 775, 3891] 
5. The District Court erred in not finding that Plaintiffs Counsel's August 27, 
2014 email and memorandum (R. at 1748-1752) delineating each encumbrance to be 
removed from the Strip Parcel, which representation did not include a demand that the 
telecommunications easement was to be removed from the Strip Parcels, to be a waiver 
by Plaintiff of that condition. 
Standard of Review. Issues of waiver are reviewed as a mixed question of law 
and fact. United Park City Mines Co. v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 
35, P 21, 140 P.3d 1200 (Utah 2006) (stating "[a]ppellate courts review the issue of 
waiver as a mixed question of law and fact: '[W]hether the trial court employed the 
proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which is reviewed for correctness, but 
the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver are factual in nature and should be 
reviev,1ed as factual determinations."} 
Preservation for Appeal. [R. at 775, 3891] 
6. The District Court erred in granting Plaintiff attorneys' fees and costs 
because the judgment had been satisfied and further erred in finding that Plaintiffs 
attorneys' fees were reasonable in this matter. 
4 
SLC_2341316 
Standard of Review. The award of fees is an issue of lm:v that is reviev;,1ed used 
the correctness standard. See Kenny v. Rich, 2008 UT App 209, P23 (Utah Ci. App. 
2008) ( citations omitted) (stating that whether attorney fees are recoverable in an action 
is a question of law, ,:vhich is reviewed for correctness). The "[c]alculation of reasonable 
attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court ... and will not be overturned in 
the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion." Id. 
Preservation for Appeal. [R. at 2373, 3 892] 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There is no constitutional or statutory provision material to this appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of Case and Procedural Historv. 
This appeal is from a final Order Denying Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction of 
Judgment entered in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County against 
Defendants/Appellants Dos Lagos, LLC, Mellon Valley, LLC, Roland N. Walker, and 
Sally Walker and the subsequent Order Granting Plaintiffs 1v1otion for Award of 
Attorney's Fees and Costs and Augmenting Judgment entered in the Third District Court 
of Salt Lake County against Appellants Dos Lagos, LLC, Mellon Valley, LLC, Roland N. 
\\Talker, and Sally 'Walker. At the time Defendant's Motion was heard, the-trial court 
converted such motion and Plaintiffs opposition thereto to cross motions for summary 
judgment, considered the proceedings as a motion for summary judgment, and entered a 
5 
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final order denying Defendants' motion and granting Plaintiffs motion, despite the 
existence of genuine issues of material fact. 
This case arises out of a deficiency action against the Defendants following the 
foreclosure by Plaintiff Red Bridge Capital, LLC ("Plaintiff' or "Red Bridge") of two 
parcels of real property in Washington County, Utah. Prior to trial, the parties entered 
into a Settlement Agreement on May 15, 2013 in which the Defendants agreed to a 
Stipulated Judgment in the amount of $2,000,000; however, the parties also agreed that 
if the Defendants performed certain actions identified in the Settlement Agreement, 
Plaintiff would promptly release the judgment and file a satisfaction of judgment. 
Defendants contend that they completely or substantially and materially 
performed all of their obligations and duties under the Settlement Agreement. 
However, Plaintiff refused to release and satisfy the judgment. Therefore, Defendants 
filed their Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment, which was converted by the trial court 
to a motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff opposed the motion and asserted that 
Defendants had not performed under the Settlement Agreement, asserting various 
questions of fact as to the Defendants' performance. Defendants asserted that a mutual 
mistake existed in the Settlement Agreement which affected, in part, the Defendants' 
performance, but that Defendants had nevertheless performed completely or 
substantially under the circumstances of mistake and that the Court should deem the 
judgment fully satisfied. Defendants requested an evidentiary hearing on these issues. 
The Court set an evidentiary hearing on July 3, 2014. Notwithstanding that the July 3, 
6 
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2014 hearing ,:vas scheduled as an evidentiary hearing and that prehearing exhibits and 
facts were submitted in advance, the Com1 expressly converted the motion to cross 
motions for summary judgment, refused to receive evidence and failed to provide any 
basis for so doing. The District Court summarily denied Defendants' motion, granted 
Plaintiffs motion and entered a final order leaving the full amount of the judgment 
intact, notwithstanding the existence of genuine issues of material fact concerning 
Defendants' performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the 
Defendants' contention that mutual or unilateral mistakes existed in the Settlement 
Agreement regarding the nature and extend of Defendants' obligations thereunder. 
The Defendants contended below and contend in this appeal that not only did 
they comply with all the requirements and conditions of the Settlement Agreement, 
thereby entitling them to a release and satisfaction of the $2,000,000 Stipulated 
Judgment, but that it was clear error for the Court to allow Red Bridge to retain the 
substantial monetary and property benefits of the Defendants' performance under the 
Settlement Agreement while at the same time permitting Red Bridge to keep and 
pursue collection of the full amount of the Stipulated Judgment, without requiring a 
valuation and accounting of what Defendants had given Red Bridge in performance 
under the Sefrf ement Agreement. 
In addition, based on the Court's errors in denying Defendants' :rv1otion for 
Satisfaction of Judgment, Plaintiff moved for an award of attorney's fees under the 
Settlement Agreement which motion ,vas granted. Defendants opposed the Motion for 
7 
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Attorney's fees because the judgment had been satisfied and further that Plaintiffs 
attorney's fees were clearly excessive and unreasonable in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case arose due to claims of deficiency by Plaintiff after it 
foreclosed on land that was previously o-wned by Defendant Mellon Valley, LLC 
within Washington County, Utah. See Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is 
attached to the Addendum as Exhibit A (hereinafter "Settlement Agreement"), at 
Recitals A & B. (R. at 777, 808). 
2. During the deficiency litigation and on or about May 15, 2013, the parties 
in the above captioned case entered into a Settlement Agreement resolving all disputes 
arising in the above captioned litigation. See Settlement Agreement, generally. (R. at 
808). 
3. The real property that was foreclosed on by Red Bridge consists of two 
parcels, one lying on the west side of Sand Hollow Road in the City of Hurricane, and 
the other lying on the west side of the road. See Id. at Recitals, generally. (R. at 778, 808). 
The Settlement Agreement defines the two foreclosed parcels as the '"Properties" and 
they will be referred to herein by the same term. 
4. One of the Defendants in this matter, Mellon Valley, LLC ("Mellon 
Valley"), owned two parcels of land on either side of Sand Hollow Road that lay bet\veen 
the Properties and Sand Hollow Road, both on the east and west side of the road. Thus, 
neither of the Properties had direct access to Sand Hollow Road. The Settlement 
8 
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Agreement and the parties have referred to these two parcels owned by l\1ellon Valley as 
the "Strip Parcels" and they v .. ,m be ref erred to herein by the same tenn. See Id. at Recital D. (R. 
at 808). 
5. A map depicting the Properties and the Strip Parcels (shm:vn on the 
map as Parcels A and B) is included in the Addendum as Exhibit B; R. at 778, 806, 
1721. The map was attached to Defendants' :Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. 
(Id.) 
6. The Settlement Agreement entered between the parties Vi'as structured to 
provide for certain perfonnances to occur upon execution of the Settlement Agreement, 
and for other perfonnances to occur up to 180 days thereafter. The Settlement Agreement 
involved both the Properties and the Strip Parcels. The Settlement Agreement also 
involved a Master Communications Easement ("Cmmnunications Easement"), which was 
owned by EVD Communications Infrastructure, LLC ("EVD"), a non-party to the 
litigation. 
7. Under the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed to the following: 
SLC_2341316 
a. Defendants would pay Red Bridge the sum of$150,000.00 in cash 
(Settlement Agreement at~ I); 
b. Defendants would consent to entry of a deficiency judgment in the 
amount of $2,000;ooo.OO (Settlement Agreement at f2); 
c. Defendants \Vould cause EVD to execute an easement termination, 
terminating the Communications Easement with regard to the 
Properties. The tennination of the Communications Easement \Vas 
to be "free and clear of any and all liens or encumbrances. 
Defendants were given 180 days after entry of the judgment to 
9 
d. 
remove any such liens or encumbrances affecting the 
Communications Easement (Settlement Agreement at, 4(a)); 
Upon execution of the Settlement Agreement, Mellon Valley 
would execute and deliver an Access and Utility Easement to Red 
Bridge across the Strip Parcels, to permit each of the Properties 
access to Sand Hollow Road for general vehicular access and 
placement of underground and above-ground utility lines in four 
locations (two from the west and two from the east) across the 
Properties. Within 180 days after the entry of judgment, 
Defendants were to cause all liens and encumbrances to be 
removed from the Strip (Settlement Agreement at § 4(b) ); 
e. Within 180 days after entry of judgment, Defendant Mellon 
Valley and Red Bridge would negotiate in good faith to enter into 
a mutually acceptable Development Agreement regarding the 
Strip Parcels and the Properties. 
(Settlement Agreement at§ 4(c)); (R. at 778-779, 808). 
8. The Settlement Agreement also provided that if "each of the events in 
paragraphs I and 4(a)-(c) occurs", then promptly upon the expiration of the 180 
day period Red Bridge would file a satisfaction of the judgment and release any liens 
it had perfected regarding the judgment without any additional. (R. at 808). 
9. Upon the execution of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants made the 
required payment of$150,000 to Red Bridge. (R. at 779; see also Stipulated Facts for 
July 3, 2014 Hearing at ,J13, R. at 2185). 
IO. Upon execution of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants consented to a 
stipulated deficiency judgment against Defendants in the amount of the $2,000,000. (R. 
at 779, 808). 
10 
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11. Defendants caused J\1ellon Vallevto execute a tennination of the 
.. 
Communications Easement in compiiance with~ 4(a) of the Settlement Agreement. (R. at 
779; see Partial Termination of Master Communication Easement for Elim Valley in 
favor of Red Bridge at R. at 1737 attached to see also August 8, 2013 Letter from 
counsel for Defendants Addendum as Exhibit Cat R. at 1723). 
12. Def end ants caused Mellon Valley to execute and deliver an Access 
and Utility Easement as to the Strip Parcels, free and clear of encumbrances in 
compliance with 1 4(b) of the Settlement Agreement. (see August 8, 2013 Letter 
from C. Dunn to D. Leta and attached Amended and Restated Access and Utility 
Easement included in Addendum as Exhibit C, R. at 1723). 
13. Defendants negotiated in good faith toward a mutually acceptable 
Development Agreement regarding the Strip Parcels; however, despite good faith 
attempts to enter into a mutually acceptable Development Agreement, the parties did 
not enter into a new Development Agreement. (See July 31, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn, 
a copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit D; R. at 888-889). 
14. Defendants believed in good faith that the parties agreed to maintain the 
existing Development Agreement, ,:vhich had been entered into bet\:veen Defendants and 
Hurricane City for the entire 2,300 Elin1 Valle)'bevefopment as a controlling 
development agreement for the Strip Parcels and the properties foreclosed by Red 
Bridge. See Id. at§ 4(c); R. \\7alker Aff. at 8jj 10 (R. at 916); see also L. ·walker Aff. at 
, 9 (R. at 895); See Also November 14, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn. ( R. at 922-924). 
11 
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Access and Utilitv Easement 
15. The Settlement Agreement defines the "Strip Parcels" as parcels " ... that are 
owned by Mellon and that are parallel to Sand Hollow Road, which bisects the Strip 
Parcels." See Settlement Agreement at Recital D (emphasis added). (R. at 780). 
16. The Settlement Agreement contains a legal description for the Strip Parcels, 
together with a surveyor's map of the Strip Parcels, at Exhibit B of the Settlement 
Agreement. A copy of the map depicting the Strip Parcels as used in the Settlement 
Agreement is included in the Addendum as Exhibit B; R. at 778, 1721. (R. at 780-781). 
17. Following execution of the Settlement Agreement, and in the process of 
perfonning thereunder, Defendants discovered that the legal descriptions contained in 
Exhibit B of the Settlement Agreement were in error, because they mistakenly included a 
small portion of land (approximately one tenth of an acre) that was owned by a non-partv 
Elim Valley Planning & Development, LLC ("EVPD"). See Map included in the 
Addendum as Exhibit B; R. at 1721; and the Map included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit B; R. at 806; (the Exhibit 1721 Map shows a parcel that is owned by Elim 
Valley Planning & Development, LLC of which a small triangle is included in the 
Parcel A depiction on the Exhibit C Map). 
18. Elim Valley Planning & Development, LLC was not a party to the above 
captioned litigation and was not a party to the Settlement Agreement. See Docket, 
generally; See also Settlement Agreement at p. 1 and signature pages. 
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19. The EVPD property was insignificant in size and insignificant in 
providing any benefit to Red Bridge as part of the frnits of the Settlement Agreement. 
See (R. at 1721, 806). 
20. The judgment ,vas entered on or about :May 23, 2013 and therefore 
Mellon Valley had until November 19, 2013, to "to cause all liens and encumbrances 
to be removed from the Strip Parcels." of encumbrances. (Emphasis added). See Id. 
(R. at 782). 
21. On or about June 26, 2013, David E. Leta, Counsel for Red Bridge, sent a 
letter to Counsel for the Defendants and infonned them that he had obtained a "Title 
Commitment" that '' ... reflects that Elim Valley Planning & Development, LLC is a 
vested owner of the Strip Parcels together with Mellon Valley, LLC." Leta Letter, dated 
June 26, 2013, a copy of which, without the enclosures, is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit E; R. at 856 (emphasis in original). (R. at 782). 
22. \Vith his June 26, 2013 Letter, Mr. Leta requested Defendants to, among 
other things, execute an Amended and Restated Access and Utility Easement that 
included Elim Valley Planning & Development, LLC as a grantor of the easement. See 
Id. 
')") 
_.J. Without coinprefiending the prior mistake in the legal descriptioris attached 
to the Settlement Agreement, and in reliance on the representation of Mr. Leta, counsel 
for Defendants caused Defendants and Elim Valley to execute an Amended and Restated 
Access and Utility Easement that included Elim Valley Plaru1ing & Development, LLC 
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(hereinafter aElim Valley') as grantor, thus perpetuating the mistake. See August 8, 
2013 Letter from C. Dunn, a copy of which, is included in the Addendum as Exhibit C. 
(R. at 1723). 
24. In an effort to correct the mistake, Defendants obtained a corrected legal 
description, and a new corrected map depicting the Strip Parcels, a copy of which is 
included in the Addendum as Exhibit F; R. at 864-877, 806. 
25. Upon discovery of the mistake, counsel for Defendants wrote a November 
14, 2013 Letter to counsel for Red Bridge and identified that the Settlement Agreement 
contained a mutual mistake of fact concerning the erroneous legal description of the 
Strip Parcels, which included a small portion ofland that did not belong to Mellon 
Valley but instead belonged to a third party and non-party to the Settlement Agreement, 
Elim Valley. Dunn explained that a judgment lien in favor ofT & R Lumber, as 
referenced in the title. However, attached to the Settlement Agreement mistakenly the 
legal description contained a small portion of land ovvned by Elim Valley. Dunn stated 
that he would work on an amendment to the Settlement Agreement in order to correct 
the mistaken legal description, excepting the portion of land owned by Elim Valley. 
See November 14, 2013 Letter from A. Dunn to D. Leta (R. at 864, 1981). 
26. In his letter ofNovember 14, 2013, A. Dunn documented that Strip 
Parcels owned by Mellon Valley were free and clear of encumbrances. See id,· 
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27. On November 15, 2013, D. Leta, counsel for Red Bridge, responded to A. 
Dunn's letter ofNovember 15, 2013. See Email from Leta dated November 15, 2013, a 
copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit G; R. at 2013; (R. at 783). 
28. In addition to its having been included in the legal description of the 
Strip Parcels by mistake, the Elim Valley property (consisting of approximately one 
tenth of an acre) was encumbered by a judgment lien of de minimus in the amount of 
$39,901.45. See Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment Against Elim Valley 
Planning & Development, LLC, p. 2. (R. at 883, 884). 
29. The T & R Lumber judgment lien on the Elim Valley property affected 
a very small section of frontage on Second Hollow Road. By contrast, the frontage on 
Strip Parcel A owned by Mellon Valley, across which Red Bridge had been given 
access to Sand Hollow Road was approximately 1000 feet long. A correction of the 
mistake and removal of the Elim Valley property from the legal description would not 
cause a material impact on Red Bridge's right to select two points of access for 
vehicular access and utilities under the Settlement Agreement. See Settlement 
Agreement. 
30. Defendants ,vorked with counsel for Red Bridge to release certain 
. easements, encumbrances and to address all issues raised by Red Bridge to ensure tliat 
Red Bridge was provided the access and utility easements it bargained for under the 
Settlement Agreement. See August 8, 2013 Letter from A. Dunn to D. Leta and attached 
signed Amended and Restated Access and Utility Easement R. at 1723-1736, included in 
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Addendum as Exhibit C; see also October 30, 2014 Subordination Agreement (R. at 
1949); see also November 14, 2013 Dunn Letter; See also November 15, 2013 Leta 
Email. (R. at 2013). 
31. On August 27, 2013 counsel for Red Bridge sent an email and 
memorandum in which Plaintiff identified and outlined all the title issues which it stated 
needed to be corrected in order to ensure compliance with the Settlement Agreement. 
(R. at 1748). Addendum as Exhibit H. 
32. The memorandum sent by counsel reviewed the title commitment which 
was issued by First American Title Company. In the memorandum, counsel stated that 
he was addressing "each title exception and how it may affect the Easement, and 
directives for [the Defendants] to resolve the title issue in compliance with the parties['] 
Settlement Agreement." (R. at 1749) (emphasis added). 
33. Counsel identified ten title exceptions that would affect the Easement and 
therefore affect "compliance with the parties['] Settlement Agreement." Counsel 
distinctly and expressly omitted any reference to exception number 20 on the title 
commitment which exception identified the Master Communications Easement over the 
Strip Parcels. 
34. Thereafter, on November 5, 2013 counsel for Plaintiff wrote an email and 
stated, for the first, time that "we think the defendants should subordinate the Master 
Communications Easement (Exception 20) to the Access Easement over the Strip 
Parcels." (R. at 19032-33). 
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35. In response, on November 14, 2013, counsel for Defendants \\Tote back and 
stated: "the first time you have requested a subordination ,vith regard to the master 
Communications Easement as to the Strip Parcels was in your November 8, 2013 email 
even though it was referenced in the title commitment as Exception 20 that you sent 
months ago. While we do not believe that that easement is a lien or encumbrance that 
was intended to be removed under the Settlement Agreement, ,:ve will agree to 
subordinate this interest as to the specific locations of the Utility Easement when they are 
determined. Please modify the subordination agreement as to the specific locations of the 
Utility Easement when they are detennined." See November 14, 2013 Letter from Dunn 
to Leta, (R. at 1981). 
36. On or about August 1, 2013, the Defendants executed and delivered to the 
Plaintiff the Partial Termination of Master Communications Easement for Elim Valley 
on the foreclosed property in accordance with ,i 4(a) of the Settlement Agreement. See 
R. at 1737, 2187; Letter to Counsel from A. Dunn at R. at C. This satisfied Defendants' 
performance under~ 4(a) of the Settlement Agreement. 
Development A2:reement 
37. On or about July 31, 2013, Counsel for :Mellon Valley wrote to Counsel 
for Red Bridge regard1ng various items relating to the-Settlement Agreement. See July 
31, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn, a copy of which is included in the Addendum as 
Exhibit D; (R. at 1663 ). In furtherance ofl'v1ellon Valley's duty to negotiate in good 
faith concerning a development agreement, in the July 31 letter: "[a]s you recall, 
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paragraph 4(c) of the Settlement Agreement anticipates discussions toward entering 
into a new development agreement between the parties. Please contact me at your 
earliest convenience to identify which individuals of your clients will be meeting with 
my clients so that I can facilitate an appropriate meeting to discuss and negotiate a 
development agreement that will comply with the intent of paragraph 4( c) of the 
Settlement Agreement." Id. at p. 2. (R. at 1663 ). 
38. Red Bridge did not respond to that portion of Defendants' July 31, 2013 
Letter and did not identify " ... which individuals of [Red Bridge] will be meeting with 
[Defendants] so [Dunn could] facilitate an appropriate meeting to discuss and negotiate a 
development agreement that will comply with the intent of paragraph 4( c) of the 
Settlement Agreement." Affidavit of C. Dunn (hereinafter "Dunn Aff." ) at ~ 3 (R. at 
891). 
3 9. On or about August 8, 2013, Mr. Dunn reminded Mr. Leta in a letter that 
he had not heard a response for the items identified in his July 31, 2013, which items 
included identifying the individuals that would be negotiating the development 
agreement. See August 8, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn (Addendum as Exhibit C; R. at 
1 723 ); See also Settlement Agreement at § 4( c ). 
40. Once again, Red Bridge did not respond to Defendants. See Dunn Aff. at 
~ 4; see also Settlement Agreement at§ 4(c). 
41. Lorin Walker, a representative of Defendants, "reached [ out] to Red 
Bridge to schedule a meeting and discuss the development agreement," but his "attempts 
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to scheduled such a meeting wit½ Red Bridge but Red Bridge did not respond to his requests 
to meet. See Affidavit of Lorin Walker (hereinafter .;L. Walker Aff.") at 'i[,I 3 & 4; R. at 
895; (R. at 786). 
42. On October 30, 2013, Counsel for Defendants again asked Counsel for 
Red Bridge for a time "when our clients can meet to work out the Development 
Agreement contemplated by the Settlement Agreement." See Letter from A. Dunn 
dated October 30, 2013, a copy of which is included in the Addendum as Exhibit I; R. 
at 1822-1827; (R. at 786). 
43. Finally, on October 31, 2013, counsel for Red Bridge emailed counsel 
for Defendant and demanded a proposed written development agreement from 
Defendants, Red Bridge never provided any proposed vvritten development agreement 
applicable to the Strip Parcels and the properties foreclosed by Red Bridge for the 
parties to review. Dunn Aff. at, 6. Email from Leta dated October 31, 2013, a copy 
of ,:vhich is included in the Addendum as Exhibit J; R. at 1829-1836; (R. at 786). Red 
Bridge did not identify any of its representatives who would attend the meeting. 
44. To the request that Defendant provide a written proposed development 
agreement for the Strip Parcels and the Red Bridge properties, Counsel for Defendant 
responded by reiterating ms proposal thatthe exiting Developinent Agree1iient be used by the -
parties. See Email from C. Dunn dated November 4, 2013 at 9:37 AM; (R. at 787). 
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45. :rvrr. Dunn's office sent a copy of the recorded Development Agreement 
for all of the 2,300 acres of Elim Valley to Mr. Leta on November 4, 2013. Dunn Aff. 
at, 5. 
46. The parties in this matter and their counsel finally met on Monday, 
November 11, 2013 to negotiate the development agreement (hereinafter "November 11, 
2013 Meeting"). See R. Walker Aff. at 17; See also Affidavit of Lorin Walker 
(hereinafter ';L. Walker Aff.") at,, 5 & 6; See also November 14, 2013 Letter from C. 
Dunn. (R. at 922). 
47. At the November 11, 2013 Meeting, Red Bridge agreed that it would 
accept the Elim Valley Development Agreement in satisfaction of the requirement under 
§4(c) of the Settlement Agreement. See R. Walker Aff. at 110; See Also L. Walker Aff. 
at, 9; See also November 14, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn. (R. at 922). 
48. In spite of Red Bridge's November 11, 2013 agreement to accept the Elim 
Valley Development Agreement in satisfaction section 4(c) of the Settlement 
Agreement, Red Bridge again proposed that Defendants simply deed the Strip Parcels to 
Red Bridge. See November 15, 2013 Letter from Leta. (R. at 926). 
49. On November 18, 2013, ignoring its agreement for the Settlement 
Agreement, asserted Red Bridge that " ... there is no practical commercial development 
that is possible on the Strip Parcels" to purportedly argue that Defendants simply deed 
the Strip Parcels to Red Bridge. See November 18, 2013 Letter from Leta, a copy of 
which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit K. (R. at 934 ). 
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50. On November 19, 2013, Counsel for Defendants ,vrote a letter outlining 
Defendants' compliance with the Settlement Agreement and the good faith steps taken 
by Defendants to '' ... negotiate in good faith to enter into a mutually acceptable 
development agreement. .. ". See November 19, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn, a copy of 
which is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit L. (R. at 93 7). 
51. Red Bridge's Counsel responded to Defendant and stated that "[i]t was 
not the responsibility of Red Bridge to initiate or propose a new development 
agreement." November 19, 2013 Letter from Leta. (R. at 939-940). 
-? :,_, On May 27, 2014, the Defendants filed a Motion for Satisfaction of 
Judgment requesting that the District Court enforce the Settlement Agreement, find that 
the Defendants have complied with all material terms of the Settlement Agreement and 
issue an order "declaring the stipulated judgment entered ... on May 23, 2013 satisfied 
pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 58B(b)." [R. at 775-776]. 
53. On June 19, 2014, the Court held a telephonic scheduling conference on 
Defendants' :Motion for Satisfaction as vvell as the Plaintiffs Application for Writ of 
Execution. On June 24, 2014 the Court entered its order on the scheduling conference 
and ordered the following: 
a. That an evideritiarv hearing would be held.on the-rnoti6ns on July3, 
2014 commencing at 9:00 a.m. for the remainder of the day until resolved; 
b. That the parties ,vere to identify exhibits, witnesses in advance of the 
evidentiary hearing and ,:vere to submit stipulated facts to the Court. 
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See June 24, 2014 Scheduling Order [R. at 2156]. 
54. Although, Red Bridge had earlier asserted that it was entitled to judgment 
because the parties failed to enter into a development agreement, and Defendants failed 
to transfer title to the Strip Parcels, counsel for Red Bridge abandoned that argument 
during the hearing because of the Court's belief that there existed issues of fact as to 
whether Red Bridge had negotiated in good faith to enter into a development agreement 
(Tr. 47:9-20; 56: 4-11) 
55. Despite the Court's Order than an evidentiary hearing would be held, and 
despite his statements regarding the need to take evidence on questions of fact, the Court 
abruptly and ,vithout explanation entered a bench ruling, denying Defendants' motion 
and granting Red Bridge's Motion. The Court's bench ruling, if it can be called such is 
stated below: 57:12 - 59:20. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
At the core of this appeal is the dispute that arose between the parties as to 
whether Defendants performed under the Settlement Agreement. The resolution of 
this dispute required a determination as to whether there was a mutual or unilateral 
mistake in the Settlement Agreement that relieved Defendants of performance, 
whether Red Bridge had waived Defendants' performance as to one issue, and acted in 
good faith in negotiating a development agreement, and, ultimately, vvhether the Court 
should detennine that Defendants had substantially performed under the Settlement 
Agreement so that the judgment was satisfied. These issues required a trial in order to 
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resolve the disputed factual questions necessary to allmv the Court to make a final 
legal determination. 
In its June 24, 2014 scheduling order, the Court ordered that an evidentiary 
hearing be held on July 3, 2014. The Court set the evidentiary hearing in order to have 
a final trial on the issues of perfonuance under the Settlement Agreement and to 
determine whether the judgment was satisfied and should be released or whether 
Defendants had not sufficiently performed and if the judgment should remain in place 
and Red Bridge should be permitted to commence collection efforts on the judgment. 
The parties complied with the scheduling order and presented pretrial witness lists, 
stipulated facts, and a joint exhibit list. 
The reversible errors assigned by Defendants and Appellants to the Court below 
commenced with the Court's procedural errors in connection with the July 3, 2014 
hearing. At the hearing, the Court determined that Defendants' pending motion for 
satisfaction of judgment and Red Bridge's pending motion to begin executing on the 
judgment would be converted to and treated as cross motions for summary judgment 
and stated: 'Tm particularly interested in what issues of fact remain open. I see both 
of these motions as basically cross motions for summary judgment on the issues." 
(Tr., at 5). Having made the determination-to treat the pend1ng motions- under a 
summary judgment standard, the Court did not permit the introduction of evidence, 
instead issuing a summary and confusing bench ruling in ,vhich the Court denied 
23 
SLC_234!316 
Defendants' motion, granted Red Bridge's motion, and disregarded or failed to resolve 
a number of legal and evidentiary issues not addressed in the Court's bench ruling. 
Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement, Defendants agreed to entry of a 
Stipulated Judgment in the amount of $2,000,000. Further under the Settlement 
Agreement, the parties agreed that Defendants would perform a number of contractual 
obligations in consideration within a stated period of time, for which perfonnance Red 
Bridge would file a satisfaction of judgment and release all claims against Defendants. 
However, if Defendants failed to perform their obligations, the Settlement Agreement 
provided that Red Bridge would retain any consideration given by Defendants under 
the Agreement and be permitted to collect on the judgment. 
The real property at issue in this case concerns two parcels which were 
foreclosed on by Red Bridge. One of those parcels lies to the east of Sand Hollow 
Road along SR-9 and the other parcel lies to the west of Sand Hollow Road along 
SR-9. The parcels did not have vehicular access to Sand Hollow Road and lacked a 
utilities easement. Defendant Mellon Valley, LLC owns two parcels that lie between 
the properties foreclosed by Red Bridge and Sand Hollow Road. A map depicting the 
properties in relation to Sand Hollow Road and SR-9 is included in the Addendum and 
attached as Exhibit B. The parcels that are owned by Mellon Valley were referred to 
by the parties in the Settlement Agreement as '·Strip Parcels". The parcels that were 
foreclosed on by Red Bridge are depicted on the map and labeled ''Red Bridge Capital 
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LLC Parcel No. H-4-2-1-1123" and ··Red Bridge Capital LLC Parcel No. H-4-2-1-
liOT. 
Red Bridge desired access to its properties for utilities and vehicular traffic~ and 
desired that an easement for communications across the greater Elim Valley be 
released as to the two properties Red Bridge had foreclosed. Therefore, in the 
Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge agreed to file a satisfaction of the judgment and 
release all claims against Defendants if they ,vould (a) pay $150,000, (b) consent to the 
deficiency judgment in the amount of $2,000,000, ( c) provide the partial termination of 
the communications easement, ( d) provide a general blanket access and utility 
easement across the Strip Parcels and remove liens and encumbrances from the Strip 
Parcels, and ( e) negotiate in good faith to enter into a development agreement for the 
foreclosed parcels and the Strip Parcels. Red Bridge acknowledged the value of this 
consideration under the Settlement Agreement to be equivalent to the $2,000,000 
judgment it would receive. 
The issues regarding Defendants' perfonnance that were left for detem1ination 
at the evidentiary hearing were: (a) whether a small parcel (approximately one tenth of 
an acre) owned by a non-party to the Settlement Agreement ,vas included in the 
description of the Strip Parcel by- mistake and should not have been included in the 
property for which removal of liens and encumbrances ,vas required; (b) whether the 
non-removal of a $39,000 judgment lien on the small parcel, in light of the $2,000,000 
value of the total consideration under the Settlement Agreement, constituted a material 
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breach of perfonnance; ( c) whether the Settlement Agreement required termination of 
the Communications Easement on the Strip Parcels and, is so, whether that demand had 
been waived by Red Bridge; and (d) Defendants had negotiated in good faith to enter 
into a development agreement for the subject properties. 
Despite the existence of numerous genuine issues of fact, the District Court 
converted the pending motions to cross motions for summary judgment, refused to take 
evidence, and disposed of the case in a summary bench ruling without issuing the 
required statement of grounds for the decision. It is clear that the Court's denial of the 
Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction (and granting of Red Bridge's motion for 
execution on the judgment) hinged solely on1 the alleged failure of the Defendants to 
provide an unencumbered easement over the 1110th of an acre parcel of property that 
belonged to the non-party Elim Valley. As noted above, Defendants were prepared to 
put on evidence at the evidentiary hearing that the inclusion in the legal description of 
this errant 1/l0th of an acre parcel was a mutual mistake that warranted a reformation 
and modification of the Settlement Agreement pursuant to Utah law. 
Further, regardless of whether there was in fact a judgment lien on property that 
was oVvned by non-party Elim Valley, such does not affect the Defendants' compliance 
1 Due to the District Court's lack of findings, conclusions or any holdings, on the record 
or in its order, the Defendants are constrained in their ability to know the basis for the 
Court's ruling. However, it is clear that the District Court did not find that the 
Defendants had breached any other provision of the Settlement Agreement, including the 
obligation to negotiate in good faith with Red Bridge on a development agreement for the 
properties. See Transcript of July 3, 2014 Hearing, R. at 3891, p. 47. 
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,vith the terms of the Settlement Agreement because the Defendants have in fact 
provided clear and unencumbered access and utility easements to Red Bridge on the 
Strip Parcels on Defendants' property and Red Bridge currently possess and enjoys 
such access and utility easements on the Strip Parcels. Such evidence was proffered to 
the Court and Defendants were prepared to introduce the same but were prevented from 
doing so. 
In denying the Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction, the District Court erred in 
several respects; namely: (1) by refusing to allow the Defendants to put on evidence 
concerning their performance of the terms of the Settlement Agreement (2) by refusing 
to allow evidence of the parties' mutual mistake concerning an errant legal description 
of property included and attached to the Settlement Agreement; (3) incorrectly 
interpreting Utah law with respect to mistake, either mutual or unilateral; ( 4) by 
refusing to permit evidence on the question of Red Bridge's waiver; (5) by failing to 
provide any ruling or basis upon which the Court denied Defendants' Motion for 
Satisfaction; (6) by refusing to determine that the Defendants had substantially 
complied vl'ith the material terms of the Settlement Agreement, such that Red Bridge 
has received an unjustified and improper double recovery. 
In addition, the Court erred in granting Red Bridge its attorney'-s fees in 
relation to Defendants' alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement. Attorney's fees 
should not have been awarded to Red Bridge under the Settlement Agreement on nvo 
grounds: first, the Defendants had complied with the Settlement Agreement and were 
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entitled to a determination from the Court that they had so complied. In addition, Red 
Bridge's fees were excessive and inappropriate. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONVERTING THE PENDING 
MOTIONS OF THE PARTIES, WHICH HAD BEEN SET FOR 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, INTO CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DECIDING TO SUMMARILY DISPOSE OF THE 
CLAIMS WITHOUT TAKING EVIDENCE. 
On June 19, 2014, the Court held a telephonic scheduling conference on 
Defendants' Motion for Satisfaction as well as the Plaintiffs Application for Writ of 
Execution. On June 24, 2014 the Court entered its order on the scheduling conference 
and ordered the following: (a) that an evidentiary hearing would be held on the motions 
on July 3, 2014 commencing at 9:00 a.m. for the remainder of the day until resolved; and 
(b) that the parties were to identify exhibits, witnesses in advance of the evidentiary 
hearing and were to submit stipulated facts to the Court. See June 24, 2014 Scheduling 
Order [R. at 2156]. 
On July 3, 2014, the parties appeared for hearing ready to conduct a trial on the 
remaining factual and legal issues. At the outset of the hearing, the court converted the 
pending motions to cross motions for summary judgment. Said the Court: "I'm 
particularly interested in what issues of fact remain open. I see both of these motions 
basically as cross motions for summary judgment on the issues." Tr., at 5. 
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First! Defendants advised the Court the evidence would show that Defendants had 
timely submitted a proposed development agreement, and that Red Bridge had agreed to 
accept that proposed development agreement in satisfaction of one of the performance 
requirements of the Settlement Agreement. (Tr. 5: 10 - 7: 1). Second, counsel advised the 
Court that the evidence would show the small piece of property owned by the non-party 
Elim Valley was included in the property description attached to the Settlement 
Agreement by mistake and the Settlement Agreement should be reformed accordingly to 
correct the mistake. (Tr. 7:3 - 8:7; 11 :7-22). Third, counsel advised the Court that the 
evidence would show Defendants had satisfied the contractual requirement regarding the 
termination of the Communications Easement and, even if the Court ,vere to find an 
additional requirement was called for under the Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge had 
expressly waived the same. (Tr. 51 :2 - 54: 17). 
During the hearing, the Court on a number of occasions recognized the existence 
of material facts in dispute on Defendants' theory of the case. For exan1ple, at one point 
in discussing Defendants' theory of mistake, either mutual or unilateral, the Court stated: 
"'And if you say it's a mistake of fact, then I guess I ,vould let you try to show that there 
was a mistake of fact. But if ifs a unilateral mistake, I'm not sure that I can hear 
· evidence on the unilateral side, because it seems to me that thaT\vou1d violate the parole 
evidence rule." (Tr., at 16: 8-16). 
Nonvithstanding the Court's own recognition of the existence of factual issues, the 
Com1 abruptly and without explanation issued a confused and unsupported bench ruling 
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without allowing evidence to be presented. To compound the Court's error in refusing to 
take evidence and resolve questions of material fact, the Court failed to issue a statement 
explaining the ground for his decision, as required by Rule 52(a), U.R.Civ.P. 
By treating the Defendants' Motion and Red Bridge's Opposition as cross motions 
for summary judgment, the Court was obligated to issue a written ruling detailing the 
grounds for its decision to allow for meaningful appellate review. See Free Motion 
Fitness, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank West, 2009 UT App 120 (a trial court should explain its 
decision in a written memorandum or order so that the appellate court is not required to 
search the record in an attempt to reconstruct the trial court's reasoning). Indeed, this 
requirement is all the more important in this matter because Defendants' Motion for 
Satisfaction and Red Bridge's Opposition were both based on '~more than one ground" 
for their respective positions. The Court openly acknowledged that the Ruling was based 
on multiple grounds. (Tr., at 59:14-20). 
A. It was error for the District Court to render summary judgment in 
favor of Red Bridge and against Defendants while genuine 
questions of material fact remained unresolved. 
Having determined to convert the parties' pending motions to cross motions for 
summary judgment and refuse to permit evidence on the factual issues remaining open on 
several key issues, the Court was required to follow the standards governing motions for 
summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P., which permits a judgment to be 
entered only where ~'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The existence of disputes as to 
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material facts disallow the granting of summary judgment. Bill Brmvn Realty, inc. v. 
Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). \Vhen material facts are in dispute~ a matter is not 
proper for summary judgment and can only be resolved by a trial. Sandberg v. Klein, 576 
P .2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
Even though this matter arose out of the context of a settlement agreement, which 
can ordinarily be enforced through summary proceedings, it is error not to hold an 
evidentiary hearing where there are factual disputes regarding the terms of the settlement 
agreement or the performance thereof. As held by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals a 
case involving facts comparable to those before us: 
·The summary procedure is admirably suited to situations ,vhere, for example~ a 
binding settlement bargain is conceded or shown, and the excuse for 
nonperformance is comparatively unsubstantial. On the other hand, it is ill-suited 
to situations presenting complex factual issues related either to the fonnation or 
the consummation of the contract, which only testimonial exploration in a more 
plenary proceeding is apt to satisfactorily resolve." 
Kukla v. Nat'l Distillers Products Co., 483 F.2d 619,621 (6th Cir. 1973). 
With respect to a question of mutual or unilateral mistake of fact, evidence is 
required in order to resolve the question. The District erred in not receiving evidence of 
mistake based on Utah law which holds that although the interpretation of a contract is a 
qt1estion _of l~w when it is bei11g interpreted by its words, it becomes a question of fact 
when it is being interpreted by extrinsic evidence of intent. Selvig v. Blockbuster 
Enterprises, LC, 2011 UT 39, ,I 18,266 P.3d 691 (Utah 2011). In other words, whether a 
mistake occurred is a question of fact for the finder of fact to decide. See Morrison, 861 
31 
SLC_2341316 
P.2d at 1062; Wolf Mtn. Resorts, LC, v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425, 19, 268 P.3d 
872; Merrick Young Inc., v. Wal-Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 2011 UT App 164, «i[l 7, 
257 P.3d 1031. 
With respect to a question of waiver, evidence is required to resolve the question. 
The Utah appellate courts have defined waiver as "the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right." See Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 857 P.2d 935 
(Utah 1993). Waiver requires three elements: (1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; 
(2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right. See Rees v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 at 1074-75. In Soter, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that although the question on appeal is "frequently [] whether, as a matter of 
law, intentional relinquishment was or was not shown ... this legal question is intensely 
fact dependent ... " Id. at 940. In addition, although a waiver Hmust be distinctly made, 
[] it may be express or implied." Id. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT. 
A. Defendants Performed the Terms of the Settlement Agreement. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, section 5 required Red Bridge 
to release the Stipulated Judgment if the Defendants: 
(1) paid $150,000.00 to Red Bridge (see Settlement Agreement §I); 
(2) provided a termination of the communications easement on the 
foreclosed property (id. §4(a)); 
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(3) provided an Access and Utility Easement on :tv1ellon Valley's property 
free and clear of encumbrances (id. §4(b )); and 
( 4) ..... negotiate[ d] in good faith to enter into a mutually acceptable 
Development agreement.. . " ( id. §4( c)). 
See Settlement Agreement, generally, Addendum as Exhibit A. 
As demonstrated above, the Defendants fulfilled each and every one of the 
foregoing requirements of the Settlement Agreement and Red Bridge has received all 
bargained for perfonnances thereunder. The parties valued these performances at 
$2,000,000. Defendants have performed under the Settlement Agreement and have 
provided Red Bridge v.'ith all the material performances thereunder. 
Because the Defendants completed all requirements under the Settlement 
Agreement, the Defendants were entitled to a satisfaction of judgment. Notwithstanding the 
Defendants' compliance with the tenns of the Settlement Agreement, Red Bridge refused to 
release the Stipulated Judgment and the District Court erred in denying the Defendants' Motion 
for Satisfaction of Judgment. 
B. The Defendants complied with the terms of the Settlement Agreement 
and Plaintiff Red Bridge was obligated to release and deem the 
Stipulated Jud2:ment satisfied. 
As set forth above, th-e Defendaiits ha,1e materiall)' complied ,,\'itfilhe fefms and 
conditions of the Settlement Agreement and are entitled to a satisfaction and release of 
the Stipulated Judgment. Defendants v .. ,rn address each of the required conditions of the 
Settlement Agreement belmv. 
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Pavment of $150.000 to Red Bridge - Settlement Agreement at § 1. 
First, as required by section 1 of the Settlement, the Defendants promptly and 
timely paid the required $150,000.00 to Red Bridge. This fact was stipulated to by the 
parties in advance of the July 3, 2014 evidentiary hearing. See Stipulated Facts for July 3, 
2014 Hearing at 113, R. at 2185. 
Termination of Master Communications Easement -- Settlement Agreement at §4(a). 
Second, section 4(a) of the Settlement Agreement required that within 180 days 
the Defendants were to "eliminate and tenninate the Communications Easement with 
regard to the Properties [ the foreclosed upon properties] by executing an easement 
tennination ... and delivering the same to Red Bridge's counsel.~, See Settlement 
Agreement at §4( a). 
On or about August 1, 2013, in accordance with section 4(a) of the Settlement 
Agreement, the Defendants executed and delivered to the Plaintiff the Partial 
Tennination of Master Communications Easement for Elim Valley as requested. See 
Partial Termination of Master Communications Easement for Elim Valley at R. at 1737, 
see also Stipulated Facts for July 3, 2014 Hearing at ~23, R. at 2187; see also August 8, 
2013 Letter to Counsel from A. Dunn at R. at 1723. As such, there is no dispute that 
this term of the Settlement Agreement has been fulfilled. Red Bridge has received this 
performance and benefitted therefrom. 
Development Agreement -- Settlement Agreement at §4(c). 
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Although the Di std ct Court and Red Bridge expressly stated, for purposes of the 
Defendantf Motion for Satisfaction, that section 4(c) of the Settlement Agreement 
concerning the negotiation of a mutually agreeable development agreement, ,,vas 
deemed satisfied and not a part of the Court's decision to deny the Defendants' I\1otion2, 
the Defendants will briefly address their compliance of the same. 
The Settlement Agreement explicitly states that: 
Mutual Development Agreement. \Vithin one-hundred and eighty (180) 
days after entry of the Judgment, Mellon, or its successor or assign, and 
Red Bridge, or its successor or assigns, shall negotiate in good faith to 
enter into a mutually acceptable development agreement (the 
"Development Agreement") regarding the Strip Parcels and the Properties 
that provides for the mutual future development of the Strip Parcels and 
the Properties in a manner that is satisfactory to both Red Bridge and 
l\.1ellon ... 
Settlement Agreement at § 4( c) ( emphasis added). 
2 As demonstrated in the transcript of the July 3, 2014 Evidentiary Hearing, the District Court 
and counsel for Red Bridge conceded that the Defendants had complied with section 4(c) of the 
Settlement Agreement, because otherwise there were abundant questions of fact that necessitated 
an evidentiary hearing. See (Tr., at 47): 
"Court: Well, Mr. Leta, if we're going to get into whether there was a good faith 
negotiations back under this language in November of 2011 (sic) or leading up to that 
_ even, don't we have a whole bunch of facts that we need to talk about?" 
"Leta: If we go there, I agree ... " 
"Court: So you can abandon that argument [the Defendants' compliance under section 
4(c) of the Settlement Agreement] for the sake of this proceeding ... [because] there's no 
question of fact on these other tv-.10 issues." 
"Leta: Yes, no question of fact on the other two issues ... " 
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Defendants accepted the obligation to '' ... negotiate in good faith to enter into a 
mutually acceptable development agreement ... " In July of 2013, the Defendants began to 
ask Red Bridge for a meeting for that purpose. Red Bridge ignored those requests, 
contending that "[i]t was not the responsibility of Red Bridge to initiate or propose a new 
development agreement." See November 19, 2013 Letter from Leta (Exhibit L). 
Defendants proposed the parties enter into the Elim Valley Development Agreement 
and master plan which already contained a specific plan for the Strip Parcels and the 
properties foreclosed by Red Bridge. See Email from C. Dunn dated November 4, 2013 at 
9:37 AM. (R. at 911-912). 
After receiving this proposed development agreement from Defendants, Red 
Bridge did not respond to the request for a meeting until the November 11, 2013. At the 
meeting, Red Bridge's Attorney, iv1r. Budge, stated that the Elim Valley Development 
Agreement was not modifiable, and Red Bridge stated it would accept the Elim Valley 
Development Agreement without changes. 
Despite the parties' agreement to accept the existing Elim Valley Development 
Agreement for the Strip Parcels on November 11, 2013, Counsel for Red Bridge stated 
that '' ... we do not see how it makes sense for [Mellon Valley to] continue to own the Strip 
Parcels separate and apart from the Properties that are owned by Red Bridge unless 
[Mellon Valley] can provide a concrete, written concept and development plan that shows 
a proposed joint development of the Strip Parcels that is mutually beneficial to both them 
and the properties." Letter November 15, 2013 from Leta. 
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This, coupled with the fact that Red Bridge never presented a proposed 
development agreement or proposed changes to the existing Elim Valley Development 
Agreement and failed to respond to requests to meet on the development agreement 
until October, 2013, shO\vs that Red Bridge did not intend to'' ... negotiate in good 
faith to enter into a mutually acceptable development agreement ... ". It shows that Red 
Bridge intended from the inception of the Settlement Agreement to have the Strip 
Parcels deeded to it. Conversely, the Defendants'· ... negotiate[ d] in good faith to enter 
into a mutually acceptable development agreement ... " as required by the Settlement 
Agreement. 
Access And Utilitv Easement 
As set forth above, the Settlement Agreement required that Defendant ''Mellon 
Valley" would execute and deliver an Access and Utility Easement on its property (the 
Strip Parcels) free and clear of encumbrances to "permit[] each of [Red Bridge's] 
Properties to have access to Sand Hollow Road for general vehicular access from a 
least two separate locations for each of the Properties ... '~ See Settlement Agreement 
at §4(b ). In addition, the Access and Utility Easement was to allow Red Bridge to 
install "such underground and above-ground utility lines and facilities as may be 
necessary or appropriate ... " Id. 
In its recitals, the Settlement Agreement affinnatively states that the Strip 
Parcels, which are those parcels negotiated by the parties for the foregoing easements, 
are ''owned by Mellon [Valley]", (See Settlement Agreement at Recital D). In 
37 
SLC_234l316 
compliance therewith, and on August 8, 2013, Defendants delivered the executed 
Amended and Restated Access and Utility Easement in the form requested and 
required by counsel. See August 8, 2013 Letter from C. Dunn to D. Leta and attached 
Amended and Restated Access and Utility Easement included in Addendum as 
Exhibit C, R. at 1723. 
There are no encumbrances on the Strip Parcels owned by Mellon Valley and the 
Amended and Restated Access and Utility Easement fully allows Red Bridge "to have 
access to Sand Hollow Road for general vehicular access from a least two separate 
locations for each of the Properties ... [and install] such underground and above-
ground utility lines and facilities as may be necessary or appropriate ... " Id. 
Therefore, the Defendants have fully complied with the requirements of §4(b) of the 
Settlement Agreement and the District Court erred by failing to find the same. 
C. Defendants' Satisfied the Requirements of the Settlement Agreement 
bv Substantial Performance. 
Even if the Court, after taking evidence on the question of mistake, were to have 
determined that the small parcel owned by Elim Valley was properly included in the 
Settlement Agreement, the $39,000 judgment lien remaining thereon was not material 
to Defendants' entire performance under the agreement. 
It is important to note, however, that "[ o ]nly a material breach will excuse further 
performance by the non-breaching party." Cross v. Olsen, 2013 UT App 135, ~ 26, 303 
P.3d 1030, 1035. See also McArthur v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 2012 UT 22, ~ 28 n. 
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7, 274 P.3d 981. In essence, "''not every minor failure justifies nonperformance and 
rescission of the contract."' Id. (quoting Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796, 806 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). For the breach to be material, '" [i]t must be something so substantial that it 
could be reasonably deemed to vindicate the other's refusal to perfonn."' Id. (quoting 
Zion's Props., Inc. v. Holt, 538P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975)). 
'"Whether a breach of a contract constitutes a material breach is a question of 
fact." Or lob, 2005 UT App at 1 26. 
The substantial compliance doctrine, requires a trial court to determine the 
materiality of the breach, and then decide whether the breaching party had substantially 
complied with the "contract". Guidance as to when a breach is "material" is provided 
in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134, 
~,i 36-37, 978 P.2d 1043, 1050. In Beus, the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the 
doctrine of when substantial performance is sufficient to satisfy a contractual 
obligation, and follmving the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, held: 
We have previously noted that the issue of whether a breach 
is substantial enough to foreclose the application of equitable 
principles is particularly fact sensitive... Certainly, it should 
be employed on summary judgment only in cases where the 
equities go only one ·way-which is not the case here. There 
v,;ere sufficient facts before the trial court on summary 
·judgment-to prevent ejectmeniofCacheCounty asa matter of 
law. However, there were clearly disputed issues of fact as to 
the adverse consequences that would be suffered by the 
parties and the equities to require a trial on the issue of 
substantial compliance. 
Cache County v. Beus, 1999 UT App 134, '1'[ 40, 978 P.2d 1043, I 050-51 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF LAW 
REGARDING MISTAKE AND WAIVER. 
A. The Court failed to allow evidence of mutual mistake and erred in its 
interpretation of Utah law. 
Red Bridge's entire argument below on this point was that the Defendants did 
not provide unencumbered easements over the Strip Parcels because there was a 
judgment lien on the 1/10th of an acre sliver of property that was owned by non-party 
Elim Valley. As set forth above, this property was not owned by Mellon Valley and 
its inclusion in the Strip Parcels was by mistake as the legal description describing the 
Strip Parcels attached to the Settlement Agreement was not noticed until November of 
2013. See November 14, 2013 Letter from A. Dunn to D. Leta. 
"[I]fthe language within the four comers of the contract is unambiguous, the 
parties' intentions are detennined from the plain meaning of the contractual language." 
Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 140 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Utah 2006) (quoting Saleh v. 
Farmers Ins. Exch., 133P.3d 428,449 (Utah 2006). Here, the Settlement Agreement is 
unambiguous. Recital D of the Settlement Agreement defines the "Strip Parcels" as 
parcels " ... that are o-wned bv Mellon and that are parallel to Sand Hollow Road, which 
bisects the Strip Parcels." (emphasis added). Further, the requirement to provide the 
Access and Utility Easement was only agreed to by Mellon Valley- Elim Valley was 
not even a party to the litigation or the Settlement Agreement. See§ 4(b) of the 
Settlement Agreement. Thus, there was no requirement for Elim Valley to provide any 
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easement in the Settlement Agreement and there is certainly no requirement for Elim 
Valley to provide any easement free and clear of encumbrances. 
The legal descriptions attached to the Settlement Agreement including the I/10th of 
an acre owned by Elim Valley were in error, but even so, the amount and location of the 
1/10th of an acre is so negligible that it does not materially impact the rights of Red 
Bridge to the Access and Utility Easement in any significant manner. Mellon Valley 
provided the Access and Utility Easement free and clear of any encumbrances as to the 
property owned by Mellon Valley. This complies with both the intent and the letter of 
the Settlement Agreement. 
Pursuant to Utah precedent, "(a] mutual mistake of fact can provide the basis for 
equitable rescission or refonnation of a contract even when the contract appears on its 
face to be a 'complete and binding agreement."' Burningham v. Westage Resorts, Ltd., 
2013 UT App 244 ,I 12,317 P.3d 445 (quoting West One Trust Co. v. Morrison, 861 P.2d 
1058, 1061 (Utah Ct. App. 1993); See also Stake Center Locating, Inc., v. Logix Comm., 
L.P., No. 2:13-CV-1090 TS, VIL 3792602 (D. Utah June 18, 2015) (citation omitted); 
Kendall Ins., Inc. v. R&R Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, c;) 15, 189 P.3d 114 
(acknowledging that "Utah courts have consistently recognized the doctrine of mutual 
mistake of fact as a basis for equitable rescission [ or refonnation] of a contract that 
appears on its face to be an integrated contract."). 
The District Comi erroneously ruled at the July 3, 2014 Evidentiary Hearing that if 
a contract is integrated extrinsic evidence of a mutual mistake is inadmissible. (See 
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Transcript of July 3, 2014 Hearing). Such an interpretation of Utah law is clear error. 
Although Utah courts do not allow extrinsic evidence to prove whether an agreement is 
integrated, it is well established that extrinsic evidence is allowed to determine whether a 
contract, integrated or not, should be reformed or rescinded due to various factors, 
including mutual mistake. See Tangren Family Trust v. Tangren, 2008 UT ,I 20, 182 
P.3d 326; E&H Land, Ltd. v. Farmington City, 2014 UT App 237, ~ 25, 336 P.3d 1077. 
The District erred in not receiving evidence of mistake based on Utah law which 
holds that although the interpretation of a contract is a question of law when it is being 
interpreted by its words, it becomes a question of fact when it is being interpreted by 
extrinsic evidence of intent. Selvig v. Blockbuster Ente1prises, LC, 2011 UT 39, ~ 18, 
266 P .3d 691 (Utah 2011 ). In other words, whether a mistake occurred is a question of 
fact for the finder of fact to decide. See Morrison, 861 P .2d at 1062; Wolf Mtn. Resorts, 
LC, v. ASC Utah, Inc., 2011 UT App 425, ~ 9, 268 P.3d 872; Merrick Young Inc., v. Wal-
Mart Real Estate Bus. Trust, 2011 UT App 164, ~17, 257 P.3d 1031. 
Because a "mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of contracting, 
share a misconception about a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their 
bargain," the party alleging that a mutual mistake occurred must establish through 
extrinsic evidence the intent of both parties. Id. This burden is not satisfied by showing 
one party's understanding of the other party's intent. Id. at~ 14. Rather, one must prove 
that a mutual mistake occurred by establishing both parties' actual intent. See Logix, WL 
3792602 at *6; Burningham, 2013 UT App at~~ 14-15; Kendall, 2008 UT App at~~ 17-
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18 (affirming trial court's decision to rescind contract because "[t]he evidence relating to 
the state of the client files during the negotiation period and to the differences reflected in 
the automated database after the sale [v.·as] sufficient to support the trial court's mutual 
mistake finding."). 
Because Utah precedent establishes that a court should allow extrinsic evidence to 
demonstrate that a mutual mistake occurred even if a contract in question is an integrated 
contract, the issue of whether a mutual mistake occurred is a question of fact for the jury 
to decide. The District Court erred in not allowing the Defendant to present evidence of 
the parties' mutual mistake. 
B. The District Court erred in not allowin2" evidence of unilateral 
mistake and erred in its interpretation of Utah law. 
In addition to the Defendants' arguments that the Settlement Agreement should 
have been modified and reformed as to the I/ 10th of an acre on the basis of mutual 
mistake, the Defendants also presented argument and were prepared to introduce 
evidence of unilateral mistake allm:ving equitable relief on this issue. 
Utah appellate courts have recognized and held that a party is entitled to equitable 
relief under a unilateral mistake theory if it can demonstrate that a "party's mistake of 
fact is cot1pled with knowledge of the mistake by the other party or a mistake i~ produced 
by fraud or other inequitable conduct by the nonerring party." Guardian State Bank v. 
Stangl, 77 8 P .2d 1, 5 (Utah 1989). See also Taylor, 2011 UT App at 'i] 4 7 ( citation 
omitted). Other inequitable conduct includes situations where the nonerring party, after 
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G,, 
Q 
learning of the unilateral mistake, attempts to take advantage of the mistake. See 
Mountain Sates Telephone & Telegraph v. Sohm, 755 P.2d 155 (Utah 1988). 
In such a situation, when a party either knows about the other party's unilateral 
mistake, creates the mistake, or after learning of the mistake, attempts to take advantage 
of the mistake, the courts will generally treat the case as a mutual mistake case. See Id. 
In other words, "the mistake provides a basis for reformation." Guardian, 778 P.2d at 5; 
See also Thompson v. Smith, 620 P.2d 520, 523-24 (Utah 1980); Jensen v. Manila Corp. 
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1977). 
For a court to rescind a contract due to a unilateral mistake, the party seeking the 
relief must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) to enforce the contract 
with the mistake made would be unconscionable; (2) the matter as to which the mistake 
was made must relate to a material feature of the contract; (3) the mistake must have 
occurred notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party making the 
mistake; and (4) it must be possible to give relief by way of rescission or reformation 
without serious prejudice to the other party. See Davis, 475 P.2d at 835. See also John 
Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1209-1210. Because such 
analysis goes to the intent of the party, whether a unilateral mistake occurred is a question 
of fact for the jury to decide. Selvig, 2011 UT at~ 18; A1orrison, 861 P .2d at 1062; Wolf 
lvftn. Resorts, 2011 UT App at~ 9; Merrick Young, 2011 UT App at Gjil 7. 
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IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING AND APPLYING THE 
LAW OF \VA.IVER. 
The Utah appellate courts have consistently recognized that a party may waive its 
rights under a contract by acting inconsistently ,vith such rights and failing to invoke such 
rights in a timely manner. See Kenny v. Rich, 186 P.3d 989 (Utah App. 2008): "Where a 
party is contractually bound to follow certain procedures and tirnelines in order to invoke 
specified contractual rights, and the party fails to do so, the party ,vaives his or her 
rights." See Brinton v. IHC Hosps., Inc., 973 P.2d 956. 966 (Utah 1998) ('"[T]he trial 
court correctly required [the party] to timely assert each objection to purported ... 
violations of the [contract], in compliance with his contractually assumed duty, or 
relinquish them[ as waived]."); see also DCM Inv. Corp. v. Pinecrest Inv. Co., 2001 UT 
91. ~ 9. 34 P.3d 785 ("[Defendant]'s failure to choose either option [as required by the 
contract] resulted in waiver of its contractual right to select an option."). 
The Utah appellate courts have defined waiver as ''the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right." See Soter 's, Inc. v. Deseret Federal Sav. & Loan Ass 'n. 857 P.2d 935 
(Utah 1993 ). Waiver requires three elements: ( 1) an existing right, benefit, or advantage; 
(2) knowledge of its existence; and (3) an intention to relinquish the right. See Rees v. 
lntern!ountain Health Care, Inc., 808 P.2d 1069 at 1074-75. In Soter, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that although the question on appeal is "frequently [] whether, as a matter of 
law, intentional relinquishment was or was not shown ... this legal question is intensely 
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fact dependent ... " Id. at 940. In addition, although a waiver "must be distinctly made, 
[] it may be express or implied." Id. 
Here, Plaintiff Red Bridge, through Counsel, waived any right it may have had to 
insist or demand that the Master Communications Easement be removed or subordinated 
on the Strip Parcels. As set forth above, on August 27, 2014 counsel for Red Bridge sent 
an email and memorandum in which Plaintiff identified and outlined all the title issues 
which it stated needed to be corrected in order to ensure compliance with the Settlement 
Agreement. (R. at 1748). Significantly, the memorandum sent by counsel reviewed the 
title commitment which was issued by First American Title Company. In the 
memorandum, counsel distinctly stated that he was addressing "each title exception and 
how it may affect the Easement, and directives for [the Defendants] to resolve the title 
issue in compliance with the parties['] Settlement Agreement." (R. at 1749) (emphasis 
added). Importantly, Counsel identified ten title exceptions that would affect the 
Easement and therefore affect "compliance with the parties['] Settlement Agreement." 
However, counsel distinctly and expressly omitted any reference to exception number 20 
on the title commitment which exception identified the Master Communications 
Easement over the Strip Parcels. Therefore, based on Kenny and Soter 's, there can be no 
question that Plaintiff, through counsel, distinctly and expressly waived and relinquished 
any right (if any existed) to demand that the Master Communications Easement was to be 
subordinated on the Strip Parcels. 
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V. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN A \VARDING RED BRIDGE ITS 
ATTOR.t~EY' S FEES. 
A. Red Bridge's Request for Attornevs Fees Should Be Reversed for the 
Reasons Stated Above. 
For the reasons stated above, Red Bridge should not prevail on Defendant's 
Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment and is therefore not entitled to attorneys' fees. If the 
denial of the Defendant's Motion is reversed, then the Defendant becomes the prevailing 
party and Red Bridge is no longer entitled to an award of attorneys' fees. Thus, for the 
reasons established above that outline why the lower court should be reversed on its 
determination of the Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment, Red Bridge's attorneys' fee 
award should also be reversed. 
B. Red Bridge has no Basis to Recover Attornevs' Fees Because There is no 
Action to Enforce the Settlement Agreement as Required bv the 
Attornevs' Fees Clause in the Settlement Ae:reement. 
Red Bridge has no basis to recover attorneys' fee because this '"'as not an action to 
enforce the Settlement Agreement. "In Utah, attorney fees are awardable only if 
authorized by statute or by contract. If provided for by contract, the award of attorney 
fees is allm:ved only in accordance with the terms of the contract." Dixie State Bank v. 
Bracken, 764 P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988)(citations omitted). 
In this case, Red Bridge brought its Motion for Attorneys~ Fees based on the 
Settlement Agreement provision that provides that attorneys' fees and costs are 
recoverable to the prevailing party of "a legal action ... to enforce any term or provision 
of the [Settlement] Agreement." Settlement Agreement at ,i 1 O; Plaintiffs i\1otion for 
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Award of Attorney's Fees and Costs a-r, 2. However, Red Bridge's attorneys' fees were 
incurred in defending Defendant's Motion for Satisfaction of Judgment. Overall, this 
was not a motion to enforce the Settlement Agreement, but was an action for the lower 
court to determine and declare that the Settlement Agreement was performed. Because 
these fees were not incurred from an action to enforce the Settlement Agreement, 
attorneys' fees are not recoverable and Red Bridge's award of attorneys' fees should be 
reversed. 
C. Even if an Award of Attornevs' Fees is Appropriate, Red Bridge's 
Attorneys' Fees were Excessive. 
The District Court erred in finding Red Bridge's attorneys' fees reasonable and 
granting Red Bridge an excessive amount of attorneys' fees. In Utah, "[a] party who 
requests ... attorney fees has the burden of presenting evidence sufficient to support an 
award." Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, if 28, 46 P.3d 233,239 ajfd, 2004 UT 22, 
,r 28, 89 P.3d 148 (Cottonwood Mall v. Sine, 830 P.2d 266, 268 (Utah 1992)). 
Further, any award of attorneys' fees "must be reasonable." Equitable Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187, 1194 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). While the, "[c]alculation of 
reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the trial court," the court must 
properly consider important factors of reasonableness. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 764 
P.2d 985, 988 (Utah 1988). ~'The evaluation of reasonableness is guided by the following 
considerations: 
1. What legal work was actually performed? 
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2. Hmv much of the v.·ork performed was reasonably necessary to adequately 
prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent ,vith the rates customarily charged in the 
locality for similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances ,vhich require consideration of additional factors, 
including those listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?" 
Strohm v. Clearone Communs., Inc., 2013 UT 21, ,i 51 (citations omitted). It is error if 
the court fails to address the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Aforgan v .. Morgan, 795 
P .2d 684, 688 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)(remanding where "there is no independent attempt 
by the court to characterize the fees as reasonable."). 
In this case, the lower court erred in denying the Defendant's objection to the 
attorneys' fees and in finding Red Bridge's attorneys' fees reasonable. Particularly, Red 
Bridge's attorneys' fees were excessive because (1) Red Bridge's counsel's hourly rate 
was excessive and (2) Red Bridge's counsel was inefficient. Red Bridge sets out all facts 
supporting its attorneys' fees in the Affidavit of David Leta of Snell & Wilmer, Red 
Bridge's lead counsel. Mr. Leta sets out his hourly rate of $550 per hour and explains 
that the billing rates of those who worked on the case "is commensurate with their 
education and experience, and are comparable to hourly rates charged by like 
professionals performing like services at regional la,v firms with offices in Salt Lake 
City, Utah." However, this statement does not establish if this is commensurate with 
attorneys located in Salt Lake City or throughout the entirety of the regional firm. 
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Next, Red Bridge's counsel was inefficient in the hours it expended and how it 
allocated work. Particularly, Red Bridge's counsel expended approximately 42.35 hours 
more than Defendant's counsel. Walker's counsel conducted the same tasks and litigated 
the same hearings and only expended 74.45 hours, in contrast to 116.8 hours expended 
Red Bridge's counsel at a much higher and unreasonable billing rate. Particularly, Mr. 
Leta, at his $550 per hour rate, did over 75 percent of the work on the case, while he had 
attorneys with substantially lower billable rates of $215.00 and $275.00 work minimally 
on the case. Nothing in Mr. Leta's Affidavit explains why he was required to do a large 
majority of the work where he had other attorneys with significantly lower billable rates 
as compared to Mr. Leta's rate of$550 per hour. 
The lower court failed to recognize that the Defendant challenged and disputed the 
exact elements that a court must consider in determining if attorneys' fees are reasonable. 
In sum, the court erred in granting Red Bridge's attorneys' fees where its fees were 
unreasonable as established above. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons and upon the authority set forth herein, Appellant requests the 
Court of Appeals to Reverse the Orders appealed from and remand for further 
proceeding. 
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